UK air-sea integration in Libya, 2011: a successful blueprint for the future? by Till, Geoffrey & Robson, Martin
Corbett Paper
The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies July 2013
UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya, 
2011: A Successful Blueprint for the 
Future?
Geoffrey Till and Martin Robson
No 12
 UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya, 2011:  
A Successful Blueprint for the Future? 
Geoffrey Till and Martin Robson 
Key Points 
 
 Libya was a successful operation fought in a manner Sir Julian Corbett would 
have immediately recognised as being typically British. 
 
 Operational success was based upon the successful integration of UK air and 
sea assets. 
 
 As a time, scope and geographically limited operation based on air and sea 
integration as part of an existing alliance framework (NATO), UK participation in the 
2011 Libya operation seems likely to help set the course for British defence in the 
short-term. 
 
 Sea based forces were crucial to ensure sea control as an enabler for projecting 
force ashore from the sea through TLAM and NGS and carrier based aviation. They 
also enforced a UN arms embargo on the Libyan regime while allowing supplies to 
reach the Libyan rebel forces.  
 
 
Professor Geoff Till is the former Dean of Academic Studies at the Joint Services 
Command and Staff College; he is currently Director of the Corbett Centre for 
Maritime Policy Studies within the Defence Studies Department. Before that he was 
Professor of History at The Royal Naval College Greenwich. 
 
Dr Martin Robson is a Lecturer at King’s College London, Defence Studies 
Department at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of 
the UK. He is a specialist in maritime economic conflict and contemporary maritime 
security. 
 
The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this publication are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD, The 
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies or King’s College London. 
UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya, 2011: A Successful Blueprint for the Future? 
 
1 
 
UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya, 2011: A Successful  
Blueprint For the Future? 
Geoffrey Till and Martin Robson 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to assess the United Kingdom’s contribution to the 
intervention in Libya during 2011, and its possible implications for the future. Set 
against a background of British strategic uncertainty over future security 
challenges, economic austerity and an ongoing commitment to Afghanistan, 
Libya provides an interesting case study with which to reassess key long-term 
debates about British strategic thinking, in particular the ‘maritime’ versus 
‘continental’ debate which so infuses much of British strategic writing. It argues 
that the work of Sir Julian Corbett, specifically his 1911 Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy, still has much relevance to thinking about British strategy and 
security in the twenty-first century. 
 
Corbett’s Thinking 
In devising their strategies, the British have always alternated between 
‘continental’ and ‘maritime’ strategies. This has never been an easy or a simple 
choice, and rarely in practice one of either/or alternatives, but in the main it has 
been a question of pursuing a maritime course where they can, and a continental 
one where they must. In this connection, it is a sad indictment of the current state 
of British thinking about strategy that the 2011 centennial of the publication of Sir 
Julian Corbett’s masterwork Some Principles of Maritime Strategy passed largely 
without comment or celebration.1  
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One of Corbett’s major pre-occupations was to help British policy makers avoid 
involving the nation in long-term continental military enterprises because he 
thought they played more to British weaknesses than to British strengths.2 The 
‘Continental Approach’ of large scale, Army-centred operations on the Eurasian 
land-mass was, and would be now, the very opposite of the kind of sea-based, 
cost-effective, offshore balancing/limited intervention ‘maritime approach’ that he 
advocated. While no-one would claim that the Afghanistan imbroglio equates to 
the Western Front of the First World War, there are certainly some disconcerting 
similarities between the two, not least the manner in which the short term focus 
on the campaign at least temporarily eclipsed the long-term maritime aspects of 
British thinking about security and strategy.3  
Afghanistan, Corbett would have said, is an example of the kind of war we should 
not be fighting, because it suits the adversary: Britain is fighting on the enemy’s 
terms. Partly of course, this is a matter of geography. Afghanistan is a land-
locked country, with a primitive infrastructure, complex social characteristics, a 
traditional aversion to central government and porous border regions abutting 
external actors supportive of the insurgency. Resourceful adversaries have 
repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to make the most of the Coalition’s 
unavoidable logistic vulnerabilities, not least the land transit phase through 
Pakistan which has so often been attacked.4 Worst of all, in Afghanistan UN and 
NATO forces are, for all their dedication and professionalism, labouring under the 
enormous disadvantage of their association with a regime seen as illegitimate by 
a disappointingly large proportion of the local population following the 2009 
elections.5  
Good strategy, a twenty-first century Corbett would say, is about making the best 
use of one’s advantages, and denying the adversary the ability to do the same. 
Importantly, Corbett understood that wars were (and still are) not the same for all 
the protagonists: 
…wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these 
forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value to one or both 
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belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one form may not be that 
best suited to another.6 
Of course, Corbett was talking about state-on-state conflict but his thoughts are 
also relevant to a counter-insurgency situation, where maximizing one’s own 
resources while denying the enemy the ability to do the same is particularly 
difficult. Worse, boots on the ground can often seem to be counter-productive, 
more part of the problem than the solution, especially when, to the locals, their 
presence seems to take the form of inaccurate air-strikes based on faulty 
intelligence which kill or injure innocent civilians. The longer garrisoning forces 
stay in such places, the worse this usually becomes, especially if they are not of 
sufficient size and suitably armed, relative to the challenge they face.7 
For such reasons Corbett, and other great British strategic thinkers such as 
General Sir Charles Callwell and Basil Liddell-Hart, emphasised an expeditionary 
and maritime approach in which ‘maritime’ decidedly did not just mean naval, 
since it incorporated land forces too.8 If the Royal Air Force (RAF) had been 
around in 1911 when Corbett wrote Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, he 
would no doubt have included air power too. When Corbett used the word 
‘maritime’ he meant a strategy reflecting the activities of joint forces in 
circumstances in which the sea is a significant factor, advocating mobile 
expeditionary forces rather than large garrisoning ones. This was the means by 
which disorder and crime could be contained and global conflict either averted or 
at least dealt early and most cost-effectively. For Corbett, Callwell and Liddell-
Hart, the way Britain was sucked into the Western Front of the First World War, 
was a regrettable and hopefully temporary departure from the British norm. 
 
The Meaning of Security 
In addition to this the widening of the concept of security has provided a further 
level of complication to Britain’s historic ‘maritime’ versus ‘continental’ dilemma. 
The news that the Taliban were responding to US drone strikes against their 
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leadership by stopping the inoculation of thousands of children against polio in 
Waziristan reminds us that conflict and war has an almost infinite capacity to 
change and hybridise.9 As a result, one of the key issues in Britain today is the 
debate over the expansion of the nature of ‘national security’. Once it largely 
meant the direct defence of national territory and critical national interests 
overseas against conventional military attack by other states. This would pitch 
conventional force against conventional force, like on like in state versus state 
conflict. Security was largely synonymous with defence; and defence was the 
prime justification for and duty of the state. 
Of course, it was never as simple as that. The military had sometimes to cope 
with domestic insurrection, even civil wars. In the nineteenth century the British 
had a variety of colonial campaigns to conduct in extending and developing their 
empire. In the case of the Royal Navy’s campaign against the slave trade, or 
dealing with the smuggling that threatened to undermine state income, naval 
forces acted to defend the state against various forms of criminal activity. But 
such things were never regarded as the ‘main effort’. Even in Britain, a global 
imperial power with very little intention of fighting a war on the mainland of 
Europe in the nineteenth century, study of the specialist demands of these 
unconventional operations were almost totally neglected except for a few 
observers like Charles Callwell. 
But now the situation has changed. The priorities have reversed because the 
concept of security has expanded. We talk of environmental security, human 
security, homeland security.10 The UK’s National Security of Strategy of 2010 
states that ‘National security is about protecting our people – including their rights 
and liberties – as well as protecting our democratic institutions and traditions’ – a 
pretty broad definition of ‘security’.11 With the expansion of ‘security’ has come a 
concurrent expansion of the main tasks of conventional forces. This does not 
mean that the conventional war-fighting roles of the military have become 
irrelevant. In fact, because major inter-state war still remains probably the worst 
threat the UK faces, deterring it through the maintenance and exercise of the 
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nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capacity is still the major 
priority.12 Therefore, despite the expansion of ‘security’ has anything actually 
changed? 
With nuclear and conventional deterrence designed to assure us that the threat 
of state-on-state conflict is mitigated, at least to an acceptable degree, the main 
day-to-day tasks of the UK’s conventional military is to deal with unconventional 
threats and situations, that include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, globalised 
criminal activity of many sorts, insurgency and various forms of hybrid war which 
may well reflect a mix of the conventional with the unconventional use of force. 
This poses some major challenges and dilemmas for Britain’s military including 
the following: 
Changing and expanding objectives. These situations are often unexpected, 
confusing, ambiguous, and subject to constant change. One lesson from 
Afghanistan and Libya is that the military can no longer expect much in the way 
of warning about future deployment (three weeks in the case of Libya) or expect 
a set of clear, long-term objectives from government that their political masters 
want them to achieve.13 They have to be quick off the mark, agile and flexible. No 
longer, for example can the British Army train, as it did for nearly 40 years, to 
meet the Soviet Third Shock army as it thundered though the Fulda Gap in 
Western Germany. Instead, modern militaries have to prepare for being un-
prepared. 
They therefore need to learn new skills, and to develop new capabilities –
and to interweave them comprehensively with the old ones. In describing this 
approach NATO uses the analogies of a twisted rope in which the various 
military, economic, social and cultural strands strengthen each other and are 
supplied from a variety of sources, governments and NGOs some of which may 
not be particularly sympathetic to the military approach. 
The need to make choices. First, the demands on the military when they are 
engaged in unconventional military operations are likely to be very different in 
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terms of approach, concept and equipment from those suited to conventional 
ones. Traditional concepts of defeat and victory may make little sense. Long 
range anti-ship missiles may not help intercept drugs smugglers. Moreover, these 
dilemmas and choices arise in an age when Britain’s military forces are facing 
budget constraints whilst at the same time confronting a wider and wider range of 
possible and necessary commitments. Accordingly, they face the prospect of 
having to make painful choices between competing capabilities. Does the heavy 
Royal Marine involvement in Afghanistan not necessarily weaken their 
amphibious expertise, for example? 
The need to cooperate with others against common threats. Because 
defence resources are finite, the military have to combine with other forces in 
order to cope with the new security threats. While much thought has been given, 
often based on practical needs and experience, as to how the military might work 
with other government departments or NGOs, the ‘integrated approach’,14 the 
development of this trend may well mean operating not just with existing allies. 
The future might lead to the UK working with unfamiliar and temporary 
international partners as part of a disposable alliance or coalition which comes 
together to tackle one issue but not others. Military campaigns and military tactics 
will need to be adapted accordingly. 
These tendencies framed Britain’s involvement in the Libyan operation of 2011 
and seem likely to shape its defence policy for the next few years and it is worth 
looking at this in a little more detail.  
 
Libya: The Main Challenges 
An unexpected, confused and changing remit 
February 2011. With the majority of British forces withdrawn from Iraq in 2009 
and with an ongoing commitment to Afghanistan British forces badly needed a 
rest.15 There was no suggestion of any further major commitments for British 
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forces; instead the focus was on cutting back on military expenditure by 
approximately 17 percent if making good the Ministry of Defence’s previous 
budget deficit is taken into account.16 But like the Arab Spring as a whole, no-one 
expected or anticipated an uprising in Libya. As it developed, the prospect of 
major instability, a humanitarian disaster in Benghazi and refugees flooding 
across the Mediterranean into Europe led to the conclusion that something had to 
be done. 
The military had three weeks warning to get something ready. But what? Initially 
the aim was to protect civilians, limit the bloodshed, and somehow prevent the 
outbreak of a civil war in an important country on the edge of Europe. It soon 
became clear that the two sides were irreconcilable and that a lasting 
compromise was not possible. The aim therefore morphed from destroying the 
weaponry that could kill civilians to facilitating regime change. Only towards the 
end did the regime itself become the enemy. If it had been from the start things 
would have been different. 
The Politics of Intervention 
Whether or not to intervene, and if so, how, became highly politicized. Hence the 
establishment of the no-fly zone in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1973 of 17 March 2011,17 the eventual acquiescence of the Russians 
and Chinese, the political importance of the support of the Arab league and the 
actual participation of countries like Qatar, UAE and Jordan were all crucial in 
attaining legitimacy. The African Union was opposed to the mission and 
Germany’s refusal to participate complicated it as a NATO operation, both  
illustrating the enduring difficulties of implementing coalition operations.18 
Limited and Discriminating Intervention 
The answer to these dilemmas was a strategy of limited and discriminating 
intervention in the best Corbettian style, with a heavy emphasis on the use of air-
sea forces and a conceptual reflection of Britain’s maritime expeditionary 
tradition. 
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For a long time the biggest initial constraint was not to be seen as taking sides 
and intervening in what could easily become a civil war. Hence, for political as 
well as operational reasons there would be no ‘boots on the ground’.19 After Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the British were in no mood for another prolonged continental 
style intervention. This was going to be an unusual operation conducted largely 
by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, operating in mutual support under 
the conceptual banner of ‘Air-Sea Integration’; in many ways Britain’s version of 
the American ‘AirSea Battle Construct’.20 
The problem was that the insurgents were as ill-trained as they were politically 
unbending and their progress was very slow. So it all took much longer than 
people anticipated. The operational strain and the usage of stocks were much 
higher than hoped for. In the theatre of operations, civilian casualties had to be 
avoided at all costs, so air and naval forces could only strike when they were 
absolutely assured of their target and with the very minimum risk to the civilian 
population. The campaign had to be highly discriminate, but at the same time 
domestic opinion in Britain and France did not want another major operation 
resulting in casualties to their own forces. They preferred aircraft to fly high but 
still be absolutely accurate.  
Large scale casualties amongst Gadaffi loyalists were to be avoided too; this was 
compounded by the ‘other side’ making the most of the problem by fighting 
amongst the people. The Libyan army even adopted the insurgent tactic of using 
‘technicals’: flat bed trucks with mounted with heavy weapons. On one occasion 
at least, moreover, the insurgents made use of captured Libyan army tanks but 
failed to let allied air forces know and so lost them to an allied air attack.  
An Allied Operation 
As far as the British were concerned it was absolutely vital to have as many allies 
aboard as possible in order to share the political, economic and military costs of 
the operation, and thus to render it cost-effective in a Corbettian way. Many allies 
were indeed secured but they came with varying degrees of commitment and 
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capability and the campaign plan had to be adapted to suit their various 
requirements.  
First of all this meant responding to the simple question of who was in and who 
was out, and so deciding what kind of coalition campaign it was going to be. At 
the start of operation on 19 March 2011 the US, Britain and France took the 
operational lead. Then the US reduced its role, leaving the British and French to 
conduct and command the operation from the sea. Then, when Italian concerns 
had been assuaged and conducting the no-fly zone became a NATO operation, 
UNIFIED PROTECTOR, on 25 March, command was moved ashore. Doing all 
this in the midst of, rather than before, military operations was enormously 
difficult but nonetheless achieved. Finally, the unfamiliar but politically essential 
Arab partners, Qatar and the UAE had to be integrated into NATO procedures 
and the Air Tasking Order. This was a challenge. 
The Modalities of Cost-effective Intervention 
The modalities of the operation can be seen as an illustration of what the 
Corbettian ‘maritime’ approach can actually mean today, and because of the 
ultimate success of the operation seem likely to provide a blueprint for future 
British military policy.  
Limited Ground Forces  
Some analysts concluded that the disorganized state of the rebels, the 
increasingly evident need for regime change, and the longer-term protection of 
the population would actually require significant coalition ground forces.21 There 
was indeed a small but important presence of Special Forces.22 But the overall 
majority concluded that ground forces were likely to prove very expensive, 
economically and domestically, and to judge by experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan would stand in danger of becoming part of the problem instead of the 
solution.23 Robert Gates even quoted Douglas MacArthur: ‘any future defense 
secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into 
Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined”’.24 
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Instead the manifest advantages of a maritime approach were clearly recognised. 
As stated above, the approach was to be determined by the concept of ‘Air-Sea 
integration’. This would provide the fastest, most discriminating and safest way of 
achieving the campaign objectives even if it was not employed as vigorously as 
the insurgents sometimes wanted. 
 
Air-Sea Integration: The Libyan Example 
First of all air and naval forces provided an effective means for the evacuation of 
non-combatants from the danger zones. Ships took thousands of non-
combatants from Libyan ports and aircraft reached deep inside a disintegrating 
country to pluck them from situations of danger.25 
This all took detailed intelligence, as did the subsequent rounds of air attack on 
government forces deemed as threatening the civilian population, or indeed 
coalition forces. The lesson seemed to be that in such situations you cannot have 
too much Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and in many 
cases the Commanders’ problem was how best to allocate ISR assets to the 
competing demands of innumerable operational sub-commanders. The ISR 
assets themselves were provided from a huge variety of sea and land-based 
sites and had to be successfully integrated across the air-sea domain and 
national boundaries. 
Even after it withdrew from leading the operations the US continued to provide a 
good deal of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) in a manner which suggests that Europe needs to beef up these 
capabilities. Air attacks had to be coordinated by E3D Sentry and Sentinel R 1 
ASTOR (Airborne Stand-off Radar) aircraft and Nimrod RI (the latter kept on 
despite Britain’s Strategic Defence and Security Review). These assets liaised 
with NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre at Poggia near Venice, which 
controlled movements of up to one hundred aircraft at a time, identified targets, 
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authorized attacks and coordinated in-flight refueling (IFR). Sentinels flew 2,200 
hours in about 200 sorties.26 
This helped meet one of the wider objectives by enabling precision attacks with 
highly discriminating smart weapons systems. In the British case, this involved, in 
order of relative precision, Paveway II and III bombs (bunker-busters v hardened 
targets.), Dual-mode Brimstone missiles from Tornado and Typhoon aircraft and 
four Apache helicopter gunships operating from HMS Ocean.27 The latter were 
accompanied by a Sea King helicopter and could only be used once enemy air 
defences had been largely suppressed. Since the Apaches flew much lower than 
the 15,000 feet of attack aircraft, they could deal with smaller, mobile targets, in 
an urbanized environment like Misrata, using hellfire missiles and 30mm 
cannon.28 They also directly assisted coalition naval forces by attacking coastal 
radars and Libyan Special Forces patrol boats.29 Two French Tiger helicopters 
and ten Gazelles operated from the French Tonnerre in a similar fashion. In order 
to ensure accuracy and avoid collateral damage, the French used air-to surface 
missiles filled with concrete or rubber.30 To avoid risking casualties amongst 
civilians who might respond to the air strikes by going to look at the damage 
caused by particular attacks, the RAF attacked at night with multiple weapons 
released on first wave, thereby avoiding the need for second wave operations.  
Carrier based aircraft were especially cost-effective since their closer position 
reduced transit times and IFR requirements and made for more responsive 
targeting.31 
Supporting the Air Campaign 
In order to deliver these effects, coalition air and sea forces needed themselves 
to be secure and supported. First of all, this required the Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defences (SEAD). The first act in the SEAD campaign was by Sea Launched 
Cruise Missiles (SLCMS) fired from Royal Navy and United States Navy 
submarines, the latter firing 221 SLCMS and the former seven shooting 
independently for the first time.32 This was followed by the institution of control of 
the air through the imposition of a No Fly Zone (NFZ) (helped by fact that most of 
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the Libyan air force defected to Malta on first sortie).33 Moreover, the Russian-
supplied Libyan system was declared outdated by many commentators - galling 
to Moscow. Even so, about half of the daily one hundred and fifty or so air sorties 
throughout the campaign were required to defend the NFZ rather than to attack 
regime forces directly. 
This demanded large numbers of sorties. By 29 September 2011, 23,246 sorties 
had been flown from sea and land sites of which 9,040 were strike missions 
(although these did not necessarily involve the release of weapons). It was 
arduous work. At one point, the RAF was down to only having about eight pilots 
trained for ground attack and single figures in its stocks of the best variants of 
Brimstone. Robert Gates said that the NATO air-operations centre had been 
designed for 300 sorties a day but was struggling to reach 150, a third of the rate 
over Serbia in 1999.34 The RAF only had five Sentinels supporting operations in 
both Libya and Afghanistan and was pushed to the limit.35 The RAF’s six 
Typhoons operating out of Giaia Del Colle in southern Italy flew 84 hours a month 
compared to 25 hours normally, initially having to rely on the Tornadoes for target 
designation as Typhoons were really designed for air-to-air combat and so had to 
be re-roled.36   
Keeping this sea and air armada flying was a prodigious task. The RAF delivered 
an average of 1.95 million pounds of fuel per day, with a peak of three million 
pounds.37 Only Britain and France were able to satisfy their own requirements 
and much of this had to be provided for other coalition partners by the US. This 
again identified a need for the European nations to address; fuel is a vital enabler 
that tends to determine who in actual fact leads operations, simply having fast 
jets is not enough. 
Sea-based forces required sea control as their key enabler. In the early stages of 
campaign, sea-based aircraft and Sentinels were mainly utilised to keep an eye 
on the daily presence and activity of the Libyan fleet in all of its ports. Later, the 
requirement to guarantee sea control led to the destruction of the Libyan navy at 
Tripoli and Al-Khums, mainly by air, and the sweeping of all mines. On several 
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occasions ships operating close to land had to protect themselves against missile 
and artillery attack from shore. HMS Liverpool for example came under fire on 
ten occasions but the ships success has reinforced British interest in the 
development of more sophisticated means of naval gunfire support.38 Sea-based 
search and rescue helicopters based on coalition aircraft carriers maintained a 
near 100 per cent availability rate and provided support for air and sea based 
aircraft in transit to or returning from operations ashore.39 
Finally, naval forces were essential in enforcing the imposition of the UN arms 
embargo on the Libyan regime and denying its supplies. Conversely naval forces 
were significant in keeping the rebels supplied, particularly those based in 
besieged Misrata and preventing Gadaffi forces from interfering with this supply 
operation. Rebel forces used small boats from eastern Libya to aid blockaded 
Misrata, and NATO stood by with humanitarian supplies.40  
 
Conclusions  
The Libya operation seems to have proved a useful and relevant illustration of 
the cost-effectiveness of the Corbettian maritime approach, as distinct from the 
continental approach characteristic of Afghanistan. Civilian collateral casualties 
were kept to a very low level, thanks to a zero-casualty bar being set and allied 
air-forces only using precision weaponry with none of the dumb-bombs that were 
used in the 1990s.41 In January 2012 Nick Harvey MP, then Minister for the 
Armed Forces, stated the UK ‘helped to enforce the maritime embargo and 
ensured that the sea lanes were free from threats to allow humanitarian aid to be 
delivered, which was particularly relevant in Benghazi and Misrata’.42 Therefore 
the operation did protect the people in terms of the object and implementation of 
UNSCR 1973 and moved on to secure regime change. This reversed what would 
probably have been the bloody defeat of the rebels by the Gadaffi regime, and 
perhaps above all for the British government, avoided another Srebenica on its 
watch.43  
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The financial costs of the Libyan campaign for the UK were in the order of £260 
million, compared to about £4.5 billion pounds for Afghanistan per annum, (and 
even more if the lifetime costs of looking after the wounded are factored in).44 
The Afghanistan operation costs to July 2011 were officially costed at £18 
billion.45 As Malcolm Chalmers has argued the cost of the Libya operation was 
‘around 12 per cent of that of Afghanistan operations over the same (six-month) 
period’. Of course a lot of other costs were born by Britain’s allies. At $896 
million, the US almost certainly spent more than either France or the UK on the 
operations, who probably owed the US about $222 million for their help.46 
Libya can therefore be seen as a successful expeditionary operation fought in a 
typically Corbettian way. It was conducted at the operational level, more than the 
tactical, but less than the strategic in the sense that it was not intended as a 
means of opening up a new front in larger war. Although it was conducted only 
across the Mediterranean, and so was geographically quite close to the main 
protagonists, it was ‘distant’ in the sense of requiring expeditionary forces to 
operate from the sea or foreign bases. For that reason it graphically illustrated 
the continuing ‘tyranny of distance’ in the conduct of military operations; even 
given the extended range of modern weaponry. For the UK the effect of this was 
reduced by good road communications to Italy for material support and ability to 
fly in key spares, munitions and people as necessary. This reduced the need for 
sea support of the kind normally required for expeditionary operations further 
afield. Above all, this was a joint operation involving the closest integration of air, 
sea and land forces. 
For all these reasons, it could be argued that Libya seems likely to help set the 
course for British defence in the next few years, a point reinforced by the decision 
to cut the Army by 20,000 in the aftermath of Libya and as the Afghanistan 
campaign winds down. But continuing financial considerations will probably play 
an even greater role in shaping Britain’s military future. Perhaps Libya is the first 
stage of redressing the implications of the SDSR that, despite being an island 
nation, Britain will be according to some analysts, the most land centric defence 
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force of all the major NATO countries by 2015.47 Therefore, while Libya was not 
only a successful operation fought in a manner Corbett would have immediately 
recognized as being typically British, when set against Afghanistan, it also 
reignites the maritime versus continental debate in UK strategic thinking. It also 
raises concerns for the future of the UK’s ability to intervene primarily utilising air-
sea integration, especially as the Libya operation was focused around those 
capabilities. It has also served to illustrate the expanded concepts of security 
twenty-first century policy makers have to deal with. Moreover as Libya has 
already demonstrated, defence planners always have to accept that a strategic 
surprise is always lurking around the corner. As Commodore Steve Jermy stated 
to the House of Commons Defence Committee: 
Events, and Her Majesty's Government's actions in Libya suggest that the UK 
has still not recovered its ability to think and act strategically in pursuit of the 
national interest. Although, at the time of writing [25/01/2012], the campaign 
appears to have taken a more positive turn, this may be temporary, and very 
possibly more to do with good luck than with good strategy. Luck - good and bad 
- very often plays an important role in operations and war, and we should 
naturally be prepared to ride good luck. But equally, we should also work to 
understand how to improve our strategy-making and, thus, our overall strategic 
performance.48 
Despite the success of Libya as a military operation, this warning should be 
heeded 
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Editorial Note 
This is an English version of the chapter written in March 2012 and which appeared in 
‘Integration der britischen Luft- und Seestreitkräfte im Libyenkrieg 2011: Erfolgreiche 
Blaupause für die Zukunft?’ in S. Bruns, K. Petretto, D. Petrovic (eds), Maritime 
Sicherheit, Globale Gesellschaft und internationale Beziehungen, (VS-Verlag, 
Wiesbaden, 2013), ISBN: 978-3-531-18479-1. The Corbett Centre would like to thank 
the publishers for permission to reproduce it as a Corbett Paper. 
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